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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Chantel Tucker appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion 
when it relinquished jurisdiction over her following a period of retained jurisdiction, or 
alternatively, by not reducing her sentences when it did so. She also contends that the 
grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the inclusion of the transcript of the 
August 12, 2010, sentencing hearing and the July 25, 2013, objection to the record 
hearing in the appellate record. Specifically, the sentencing transcript impacts the 
decision to relinquish jurisdiction and was part of the record available to the district court 
at that time. The objection to the record transcript is necessary because it 
demonstrates the district court's error in denying Ms. Tucker's request for the 
sentencing transcript. Therefore, even under the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion 
in State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724 (2013), reh'g denied, the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision to deny her motion to augment the record with those transcripts violated her 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. As a result, this Court should 
grant Ms. Tucker access to the requested transcripts and allow her the opportunity to 
file supplemental briefing raising any issues arising from review of those transcripts. 
In the event that request is denied, this Court should still vacate the district 
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction over Ms. Tucker and remand this case for an 
order placing her on probation. Alternatively, this Court should either reduce her 
sentence as it sees fit or remand the case so the district court can reduce her sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In April 2009, the State charged Ms. Tucker with possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia (hereinafter, the 
1 
Cassia County case). (R., Vol.1, pp.19-20)1 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Tucker 
entered a plea of guilty to the possession of methamphetamine charge, and in 
exchange, the State dismissed the possession of drug paraphernalia charge and 
recommended Ms. Tucker's participation in drug court. (R., Vol.1, pp.67-68.) There 
was no agreement as to recommendations on the underlying sentence. ( See generally 
R., Vol.1, pp.67-69.) In fact, no sentence was imposed, as Ms. Tucker was 
subsequently accepted into drug court. (See R., Vol.1, pp.13-16 (register of actions for 
the relevant time period); see generally R., Vol.1, pp.57-174.) 
Ms. Tucker was ultimately terminated from drug court in May 2010. (R., Vol.1, 
p.123.) While Ms. Tucker did not agree with the allegations underlying that order, she 
decided to not contest the order and proceed to sentencing. (R., p.162.) As such, the 
district court ordered preparation of a presentence report (hereinafter, PSI). The GAIN-I 
Recommendation and Referral Summary (hereinafter, GRRS) attached to that report 
indicated that Ms. Tucker had been diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. (GRRS 
attached to PSI, p.2.) Nevertheless, a letter from the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare (hereinafter, IDHW) verified that Ms. Tucker had been maintaining two jobs, 
had a strong support network centered around her children's paternal grandparents, 
and had been consistently performing drug tests with negative results. (Letter from 
Beth Bristol attached to PSI, dated July 17, 2010.) As a result, IDHW intended to 
continue the reunification process with Ms. Tucker and her children, but were waiting on 
the sentencing decision to do so. (Letter from Beth Bristol attached to PSI.) The 
1 The records on appeal for these two cases were prepared in separately bound and 
paginated volumes. To avoid confusion, the volume prepared for the Cassia County 
case (docket number 40981) will be referred to as "Vol.1." The record prepared for the 
Minidoka County case (docket number 40923) will be referred to as "Vol.2. 
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presentence investigator recommended that Ms. Tucker be placed on probation 
because she had continued to participate in treatment programs even after being 
removed from the drug court program, had employment arranged, and had enrolled in 
collegiate classes. (PSI, p.10.) Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified sentence 
of seven years, with two years fixed, which it suspended for a five-year period of 
probation. (R., Vol.1, pp.165, 171-72.) 
Nearly two years later, when Ms. Tucker's mother passed away, she relapsed. 
(Tr., p.23, Ls.22-25.) As a result, the State filed a motion for probation violation 
based on the fact that new charges for possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia had been filed in Minidoka 
County (hereinafter, the Minidoka County case). (R., Vol.1, pp.188-89; R., Vol.2, 
pp.10-11.) 
Ms. Tucker ultimately entered into a global plea agreement, by which she would 
plead guilty to possession of methamphetamine in the Minidoka County case, and 
thereby admit the violation of her probation in the Cassia County case. (R., Vol.2, 
pp.34-36.) In exchange, the State would dismiss all remaining charges, recommend a 
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, in the Minidoka County case to be 
served concurrently with the sentence in the Cassia County case, and would 
recommend that the district court retain jurisdiction in both cases so Ms. Tucker could 
participate in the CAPP rider program. (Tr., p.5, L.18 - p.6, L.17; R., Vol.2, pp.34-36.) 
Defense counsel recommended the same underlying sentence, but requested the 
district court suspend the sentences for a period of probation instead. (Tr., p.22, Ls.14-
19.) Ms. Tucker informed the district court that she would lose custody over her 
children if she was sent to the CAPP program. (Tr., p.25, Ls.3-6.) The district court 
3 
recognized several of these issues, but determined that the CAPP rider program would 
provide Ms. Tucker the opportunity to get in better control of her addiction. (Tr., p.25, 
L.20 - p.26, L.13.) Therefore, it revoked Ms. Tucker's probation in the Cassia County 
case and executed the underlying sentence and imposed a consecutive unified 
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, in the Minidoka County case, and retained 
jurisdiction in both cases. (R., Vol.1, pp.222-26; R., Vol.2, pp.44-49.) 
The rider staff ultimately recommended that the district court relinquish 
jurisdiction over Ms. Tucker because of her unwillingness to participate in the rider 
program. (Addendum to PSI (hereinafter, APSI), cover letter.) The staff reported that 
Ms. Tucker had completed most of her assigned programs, but had failed the Moral 
Recanation Therapy (hereinafter, MRT) program and was removed from her Computer 
Literacy program. (APSI, p.2.) The rider staff also reported that Ms. Tucker was not 
honest with them during the MRT program. (APSI, p.6.) They also noted that, while 
Ms. Tucker had not received any formal disciplinary reports, there were several informal 
sanctions imposed against her. (APSI, pp.4-5.) The district court ultimately 
relinquished jurisdiction over Ms. Tucker without a hearing. (R., Vol.1, pp.229-32; 
R., Vol.2, pp.57-60.) She also filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35 in the Minidoka case 
requesting that the district court reconsider the sentence. (R., Vol.2, p.62.) The district 
court granted that motion, ordering the two sentences to be served concurrently 
because it felt that Ms. Tucker needed access to the prison's therapeutic community 
program and the sentences as originally structured would unacceptably delay her 
participation in that program. (R., Vol.2, p.62.) 
Ms. Tucker ultimately filed timely notices of appeal from the orders relinquishing 
jurisdiction. (R., Vol.1, pp.239-40; R., Vol.2, pp.79-80.) She subsequently filed 
4 
amended notices of appeal. (R., Vol.1, pp.248-51; R., Vol.2, pp.88-91.) In the Cassia 
County case, the amended notice of appeal included requests for preparation of the 
transcripts of several hearings: the August 27, 2009, change of plea hearing, the 
January 8, 2010, evidentiary hearing, the August 12, 2010 sentencing hearing, and the 
August 9, 2012, disposition hearing.2 (R., Vol.1, pp.248-51.) The State objected to that 
amended notice of appeal. (R., Vol.1, pp.253-57.) The district court held a hearing to 
address that issue on July 25, 2013. At that hearing, defense counsel "argue[d] his 
motion re: request to amend the Motion and need for transcripts at the county's 
expense; cite[d] considerations." (Augmentation - Minutes.)3 Counsel for the State 
"argue(d] against the motion for transcripts paid by the county; cite[d] considerations." 
(Augmentation - Minutes.) The district court denied that motion and "cite[d] 
considerations" for doing so. (Augmentation - Minutes.) The district court subsequently 
prepared an order to that effect: "for the reasons stated in open court at the hearing 
(the court] does hereby sustain the objection as to the transcript Sentencing hearing 
held on August 12, 2010 .... " (Augmentation - Order.) 
As a result, once the record was settled, Ms. Tucker filed a motion to augment 
the record with the transcripts from the August 12, 2010, sentencing hearing and the 
transcript of the July 25, 2013, telephonic hearing on the objection to the record. 
(Motion to Augment and To Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support 
Thereof, filed October 18, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion without 
2 Ms. Tucker is not pursuing her requests for the transcripts of the August 27, 2009, 
change of plea hearing or the January 8, 2010, evidentiary hearing in this appeal. 
3 A motion to augment the record with the minutes of the July 25, 2013, hearing, as well 
as the subsequent order has been filed contemporaneously with this brief. 
5 
explanation. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, 
dated November 22, 2013.) 
6 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court denied Ms. Tucker due process and equal protection 
when it denied her request in the Amended Notice of Appeal to include 
transcripts necessary for review of the issues on appeal. 
2. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. Tucker due process and equal 
protection when it denied her motion to augment the record with transcripts 
necessary for review of the issues on appeal. 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction 




The District Court Denied Ms. Tucker Due Process And Equal Protection When It 
Denied Her Request In The Amended Notice Of Appeal To Include Transcripts 
Necessary For Review Of The Issues On Appeal 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered when indigent defendants are 
entitled to transcripts prepared at state expense on appeal. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724. Its 
opinion reaffirmed the existing standard of review, which is that, when reviewing 
decisions such as the decision to relinquish jurisdiction, "this Court conducts an 
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, 
focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment." Id. at 728 (emphasis added) (citing 
State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010)). The Idaho Supreme Court also recognized that 
there is a federal and state constitutional requirement for the State to provide transcripts 
sufficient for an adequate appellate review. See id. at 727-28 (citing Mayer v. City of 
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462 (2002)). 
That requirement is part of the guarantees in the United States Constitution and 
the Constitution of the State of Idaho that criminal defendants shall have due process 
and equal protection under the law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. I,§ 13. 
Essentially, due process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); State v. Card, 
121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991 ). Those same standards have been applied to article I, 
section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare ex rel. 
Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether 
transcripts must be provided to indigent defendants when such a right is established. 
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See, e.g., Griffin v. fllinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)4; Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); 
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1963); Mayer, 404 U.S. 189. Its decisions 
have established two fundamental themes. First, the scope of the due process and 
equal protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of indigent defendants 
is not tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate 
review, but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials. See, e.g., 
Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195. 
As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in order to show that the 
transcript requested is necessary for an adequate appellate review, the party moving for 
its inclusion in the record "must make out a colorable need for the additional 
transcripts."5 Brunet , 155 Idaho at 727; but see Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195 ("where the 
4 In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court held: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious 
discriminations. 
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
5 "It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate 
record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... 
and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to 
support the actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); 
see also State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805 (1996) (applying this presumption in 
absence of a complete record). Therefore, if Ms. Tucker fails to provide the appellate 
court with the transcripts necessary for review of her claims, this legal presumption will 
apply and Ms. Tucker's claims regarding the erroneous relinquishment of jurisdiction 
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grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete transcript, 
the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' 
will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds"). 
In this case, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the inclusion of 
the transcript of the sentencing hearing in the appellate record. The minutes of 
sentencing hearing held on August 12, 2010, indicate that "Ms. Tucker addresses the 
Court." (R., Vol.1, pp.164-65.) When a defendant makes a statement of allocution at a 
sentencing hearing, those comments are relevant to the sentencing determination. 
See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003), abrogated on other 
grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied, 
(finding that, while allocution is important, it does not rise to the level of a constitutionally 
protected right, as the opinions in Gervasi and other cases had suggested). Therefore, 
those statements are relevant to the subsequent question of whether to reduce the 
sentence pursuant to Rule 35. See Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648; State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 
203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990). However, the minutes do not reveal the contents of 
and the violation of her due process rights by the district court will not be addressed on 
their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
district court not affording her access to relevant transcripts) would deprive her of an 
effective appeal, making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process and equal 
protection grounds. See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963) (holding that it is 
"constitutionally invalid . . . to prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal") 
(emphasis added). 
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from having 
access to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection 
and due process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485. 
In this situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed, and what occurred at 
those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's decisions. For 
example, the transcript from the sentencing hearing should be not be presumed to 
support the decision to relinquish jurisdiction because the district court obviously 
concluded at the sentencing hearing that the aggravating information was insufficient to 
justify incarcerating Ms. Tucker at that time, given the objectives of sentencing. See 
I.C. § 19-2521; State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). 
10 
Ms. Tucker's statements to the district court. (See generally R., Vol.1, pp.164-65.) 
Therefore, the minutes of these hearings do not provide an adequate alternative to the 
verbatim transcript. Thus, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the 
transcript of the August 12, 2010, sentencing hearing in this case. 
The only other question, then, is whether those statements were part of the entire 
record available to the district court when it subsequently revoked Ms. Tucker's 
probation. See Brunet, 155 Idaho at 728; Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5. The district court is 
entitled to rely on the knowledge gained from its own official position and observations, 
and thus, it is actually expected to rely on its memory of prior proceedings in a case. 
See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 
105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing 
are based, in part, upon what the district court heard during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 
Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district court could rely upon "the number of 
certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within 
his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Adams, 115 
Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the district court "naturally and 
quite properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in 
reaching a decision"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that 
"the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about (the 
defendant] from the other case"). Since the same district court judge who relinquished 
jurisdiction over Ms. Tucker also presided over the sentencing hearing (compare 
R., Vol.1, pp.164, 229-32), the comments made by Ms. Tucker at that hearing are part 
of the record that was available to the district court when it relinquished jurisdiction over 
her. 
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Therefore, because the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for that 
transcript and it was part of the record before the district court when it relinquished 
jurisdiction, due process and equal protection require that they be augmented to the 
appellate record. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195; Brunet, 155 Idaho at 727. As such, the 
district court's decision to deny Ms. Tucker's request to augment the record with that 
transcript each violate her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. 
In that same vein, an adequate appellate record is necessary to vindicate 
Ms. Tucker's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). 
Appellate counsel is required to make a conscientious examination of the case and file 
a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The standards for effective appellate representation are set 
forth in the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense 
Function. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds 
by Card, 121 Idaho at 432. Specifically, Standard 4-8.3(b) provides: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate counsel can 
neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on 
appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's decision to 
12 
revoke probation, which is now at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise 
Ms. Tucker on the probable role the transcripts may play in her appeal. Therefore, 
Ms. Tucker has not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the 
merits of her claims and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in 
that endeavor. 
11. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Tucker Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For Review 
Of The Issues On Appeal 
As discussed in Section I, supra, the grounds for appeal make out a colorable 
need for the inclusion of the transcript from the August 12, 2010, sentencing hearing. 
Therefore, for the same reasons discussed supra, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision 
to deny Ms. Tucker's motion to augment the record with that transcript violated her 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195; 
Brunet, 155 Idaho at 727. 
However, the Idaho Supreme Court also violated Ms. Tucker's rights in that 
regard by denying her request to augment the record with a transcript of the July 25, 
2013, hearing. That hearing was held because Ms. Tucker had asked the district court 
to order that certain transcripts, including the transcript of the August 12, 2010, 
sentencing hearing, be included in the appellate record. Arguments were made for and 
against that request, and the district court gave its reasons for denying the request 
in open court. (Augmentation - Minutes; Augmentation - Order) Thus, because 
Ms. Tucker is contending on appeal that the district court's decision on that request 
violated her due process rights, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for 
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that transcript to be included in the appellate record. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195; Brunet, 
155 Idaho at 727. 
Furthermore, there is no adequate alternative to the verbatim transcript of that 
hearing. Compare, e.g., Brunet, 155 Idaho at 728 (holding that the other materials in 
the record provided a sufficient record for review). The amended notice of appeal only 
designates the transcripts requested; it does not make an argument as to why they are 
necessary.6 (R., Vol.1, pp.248-251; R., Vol.2, pp.88-91.) The minutes state that the 
parties argued the motion and the district court ruled on the motion, but does not recite 
what those arguments or decision were. (See Augmentation - Minutes.) Instead, the 
minutes simply report that the parties and the district court "cite[d] considerations." 
(Augmentation - Minutes.) The order on the objection states "for the reasons stated in 
open court at the hearing [the court] does hereby sustain the objection . . . ." 
(Augmentation - Order.) As a result, there is nothing that is in the record or that could 
be augmented to this record which would provide this Court with a sufficient record to 
review the district court's decision. Thus, there is a colorable need for the transcript of 
the July 25, 2013, hearing. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195; Brunet, 155 Idaho at 727. 
Furthermore, the arguments made at that hearing on that motion were obviously part of 
the record considered by the district court when it made its decision on the motion. 
Therefore, the decision to deny Ms. Tucker access to that transcript violated her 
constitutional rights because it deprived her of an adequate appellate record. 
6 The Idaho Appellate Rules require only that that the appellant "designat[e] . . . 
whether a transcript is requested." I.A.R. 17(h). The amended notice of appeal in this 
case also conforms to the exemplar notice of appeal provided in the rule. See I.A.R. 17. 
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111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Ms. Tucker. Or. Alternatively. By Not Reducing Her Sentences When It Did So 
A. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over 
Ms. Tucker 
The district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard. State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App. 2011 ); 
State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001 ). Such a decision will not be considered an 
abuse of discretion "if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate." Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. 
'The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the trial court 
additional time for evaluation of the defendant's rehabilitation potential and suitability for 
probation." State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990). In making that 
determination, the district court "considers all of the circumstances to assess the 
defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured environment and to determine the 
course of action that will further the purposes of rehabilitation, protection of society, 
deterrence, and retribution." Statton, 136 Idaho at 137. It is guided in this 
determination by I.C. § 19-2521. Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. In this regard, the need to 
protect society is the primary objective the court should consider. See, e.g., 
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). As such, a disposition that protects 
society and also accomplishes the other objectives (rehabilitation, deterrence, and 
punishment) will be considered reasonable. See id. This is because the protection of 
society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and therefore, each must be 
addressed in the disposition. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
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There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether the 
objectives are served by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 
320 (2006). They include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, 
status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to 
treatment, and support of family." Id. These factors are also embodied in the factors 
set forth in I.C. § 19-2521. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis 
for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 
593, 595 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 
121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990). In this case, several of those 
factors are present, but were insufficiently considered by the court as it made its 
disposition regarding Ms. Tucker after she completed her period of retained jurisdiction. 
A sufficient consideration reveals that Ms. Tucker's performance during her period of 
retained jurisdiction, when combined with the mitigating factors present in her case, 
indicate that he should be able to succeed in a less structured environment and a 
disposition providing her with the opportunity to do so will still serve the objectives. 
Therefore, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction does not serve the objectives, and is an 
abuse of the district court's discretion. 
Notably, the conviction in the Cassia County case was Ms. Tucker's first felony 
conviction. (PSI, pp.3-4.) The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first 
offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." 
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595, (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394,402 (1953), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971 )). Therefore, it 
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considered the fact that it was the defendant's first felony to be a factor in mitigation. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
Furthermore, Ms. Tucker was only twenty-two years old when she was 
sentenced in the Cassia County case. (PSI, p.1.) Studies indicate that a young 
person's character continues to develop into early adulthood. See, e.g., Brief for the 
American Psychological Association, et al. as Amici Curiae in Graham v. Florida, 130 
S. Ct. 2011 (2010), 2009 WL 2236778, at 12. For example, a young person's ability to 
consider future consequences of an action continues to develop into the early 20s. Id. 
(referencing Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the 
Development of Future Orientation and Planning, 11 Developmental Rev. 1, 28-29 
(1991); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay 
Discounting, 80 Child Dev. 28, 30, 35-36 (2009)). As such, when a defendant is of an 
age similar to Ms. Tucker, her age is a factor which weighs in mitigation because it 
speaks significantly to this rehabilitative potential. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 395; Cook, 
145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). Basically, a 
younger offender should be treated more leniently because she is still maturing, and still 
able to become a productive member of society. See, e.g., State v. Dunnagan, 101 
Idaho 125, 126 (1980). 
In addition, Ms. Tucker had a troubled childhood. Her mother's addiction to 
drugs led to and facilitated Ms. Tucker's own addiction. (PSI, p.5.) Another result of her 
mother's addiction was an unstable home life, which resulted in abuse. (PSI, p.5.) In 
fact, Ms. Tucker ultimately had to be adopted by her brothers, a situation which fell 
apart when she turned eighteen. (PSI, p.5.) Ms. Tucker also reported being raped by a 
friend when she was fourteen. (PSI, p.5.) When a defendant has a troubled history, 
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particularly when it serves as a precursor to the abuse of narcotics, and thus, the 
underlying offense, that is a factor which should be weighed against the offense. 
State v. Williamson, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
And yet, despite her past, Ms. Tucker had been making commendable efforts at 
rehabilitation. As IDHW reported, Ms. Tucker was able to maintain employment with 
two different employers. (Letter from Beth Bristol attached to PSI.) One of those 
employers also wrote a letter in support of Ms. Tucker, noting that she was a good 
worker and an asset to the company. (Undated Letter from the manager of Mr. Wash, 
attached to PSI; compare PSI, p.7 (indicating that Ms. Tucker had verified employment 
at Mr. Gas Car Wash).) A defendant's reliability and dedication as a working member of 
society is a factor which the district courts should consider as part of the defendant's 
character. State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292,293 (Ct. App. 1991). Furthermore, Ms. Tucker 
has the potential to become an even more productive member of society, as she has 
verified college education and was planning on taking additional classes while on 
probation. (PSI, p.10.) 
Ms. Tucker had also been building a support network centered on her children's 
paternal grandparents.7 (Letter from Beth Bristol attached to PSI.) As such, IDHW was 
working towards reunification between Ms. Tucker and her children. Family constitutes 
an important part of a support network, which can help in rehabilitation. See 
State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812,817 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that familial support offered 
7 The family of Ms. Tucker's fiance has remained her primary source of support, even 
though a No Contact Order was placed between Ms. Tucker and her fiance by the 
department of probation and parole, as both had been convicted of felonies. (See 
R., Vol.1, p.131.) The drug court judge, recognizing the issue in this regard, specifically 
allowed Ms. Tucker to maintain contact with her fiance's family, so long as she did not 
have contact with her fiance. (R., Vol.1, p.131.) 
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to affirm the defendant's innocence does not equate to familial support offered in 
consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the support been offered for 
rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration). The fact that 
Ms. Tucker was building such a network was a factor that needed to be considered in 
mitigation. 
Unfortunately, this network was not strong enough when Ms. Tucker's mother 
passed away, an event which was a primary contributor to her relapse. That is not 
surprising when Ms. Tucker's mental condition is sufficiently considered. (See GRRS, 
p.2 (diagnosing Ms. Tucker with major depressive disorder).) Idaho Code § 19-2523 
requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. 
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). That condition is capable of preventing a 
person from functioning normally. National Institute of Mental Health, "Depression," p.3 
(revised 2011 ), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/depression/ 
depression-booklet.pdf. Episodes of depression are often caused by a combination of 
genetic, biological, environmental, and psychological factors. Id. at 6. Thus, although 
Ms. Tucker was performing well on probation for the first two years, the effect of her 
mother's death, when viewed in context with her mental health diagnosis, indicates that 
Ms. Tucker, once stabilized, could return to being a productive member of society, and 
thus, capable of complying with the terms and conditions of probation. Therefore, the 
district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Ms. Tucker's performance during her rider, while not perfect, also demonstrates 
a potential for rehabilitation. After all, she was able to complete most of her assigned 
programs and she did not receive any formal disciplinary sanctions. (APSI, pp.2, 4-5.) 
Furthermore, as the district court pointed out in relation to Ms. Tucker's subsequent 
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request for relief pursuant to I.C.R. 35, Ms. Tucker could still benefit from additional 
treatment programs. (R., Vol.2, p.69.) IDHW already verified that Ms. Tucker is willing 
and capable of following through on such treatment in the community. ( See Letter from 
Beth Bristol attached to PSI.) Therefore, this also indicates that a more lenient 
sentence was appropriate in Ms. Tucker's case. 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that suspended sentences, 
which consider rehabilitation, would still address all the other objectives - protection of 
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) 
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a 
sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes and 
executes a sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the 
imposed sentence are still present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 
(Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the 
sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those 
objectives). In addition to restricting her liberty at the discretion of the Board of 
Correction and the looming sentence, Ms. Tucker would also be deprived of several of 
her rights (such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. 
Furthermore, the district court would retain the ability to revoke probation and execute 
the original sentence if Ms. Tucker were to fail to adhere to the terms of her probation. 
However, it could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives properly addressed. 
What the probationary period would provide that a term sentence would not is the 
opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing Ms. Tucker to apply the 
lessons she would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting. The decision to 
incarcerate her, on the other hand, only serves to delay that sort of rehabilitative 
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opportunity, and thus, does not as effectively address the goals of sentencing. As such, 
it constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
8. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Reducing Ms. Tucker's Sentence 
When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over Her 
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction, it 
did abuse its discretion by not reducing Ms. Tucker's sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to 
I.C.R. 35 when it did so. After a defendant has completed a period of retained 
jurisdiction, the district court may suspend the sentence, which results in the defendant 
being placed on probation, or it can resume the execution of the underlying sentence. 
State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2003). If the district court decides to 
resume the execution of the underlying sentence, it also has the authority to reduce the 
sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. Id.; see also State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 
779, 782 (2008) (applying the same rule to the decision to the similar situation of 
probation revocation). 
The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on 
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Hanington, 
148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and factors considered in 
such a decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id. (citing among 
others, State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)). Therefore, the district 
court needed to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the 
mitigating factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure to do 
so should result in a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; 
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
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A sufficient examination of the factors discussed in Section ll(A), supra, reveals 
that, at least, more lenient sentences were appropriate. More lenient sentences would 
still address all the sentencing objectives. See e.g., Crockett, 146 Idaho at 14-15 
(discussing how even a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing 
objectives). In this case, the court would not lose anything in terms of protection of 
society, deterrence, or punishment by imposing a more lenient sentence. Society would 
receive equally similar protection in both cases, as Ms. Tucker would be in the custody 
of the Department of Correction either way. She would be unable to harm society 
during the period of initial incarceration, and the parole board would maintain the 
discretion to release her again, or, if need be, continue to keep her in prison. 
What the more lenient sentence would provide that the excessive sentence 
would not is the opportunity to rehabilitate, and as the Supreme Court has noted, 
rehabilitation is more likely now than in the future. See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. 
Specifically, it would give Ms. Tucker the opportunity to return to her children and work 
on rebuilding her support network while being a contributing member of her community. 
To not do so will result in lesser protection for society in the long term, which means the 




Ms. Tucker respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Ms. Tucker respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction and remand this case 
for an order placing her on probation. Alternatively, she requests that this Court reduce 
her sentences as it deems appropriate, or remand the case for a reduction of sentence 
pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 
DATED this 20th day of March, 2014. 
RIANR. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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